Abstract: Does cabinet size impact economic policy in Africa? The average number of ministers has increased steadily for four decades, yet we know little about the economic effects of new portfolios, despite popular complaints about costly cabinets. Comparative studies generate conflicting expectations, either blaming coalition governments for patronage or crediting them with economic restraint. Using data on 45 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1971 and 2006 our empirical analysis links parties and portfolios to budgetary policy performance. We show that cabinets with more ministries are associated with budget surpluses, but they are also slightly more likely to engage in patronage spending. Next, we find that cabinets governing through multiparty coalitions have no consistent impact on budget surpluses. However they are strongly associated with less extractive government and lower rates patronage spending compared to single party cabinets. These results hold after controlling for the type of colonial legacy, economic conditions, population size, constraints on executives, level of democracy, oil income, type of party system, and ethnic and religious fractionalization. We conclude that parties and portfolios are both important but they have different effects: adding portfolios to the cabinet may improve economic outcomes by enhancing specialization, but governance through multiparty cabinets generates incentives to both limit extraction and restrain patronage spending. Africa, yet it is not clear if these trends have affected economic performance.
DOES CABINET SIZE IN AFRICA ADVERSELY IMPACT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE? SEVERAL STUDIES
note that Africa has the largest cabinets in the world (Mwenda 2011; van de Walle 2001) , and a large literature links institutional incentives for good policy choices to economic outcomes (Alence 2004; Ndulu et al. 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012 ). Yet few studies consider the economic consequences of cabinets even though institutional research identifies them as a critical source of variation among executives. Africans are often quite willing to create new ministries if they appear necessary to address complex problems. Nigeria created a Niger Delta portfolio in 2008 to coordinate the severe developmental challenges in its oil southern producing region, which had inspired militant rebellions. The idea of a new ministry devoted entirely to development of the northern region quickly garnered public support a few years later when a different (and even more militant rebellion) confronted the northeast (Adibe 2014) . At the same time, citizens across the continent often complain about the financial costs of ministries.
Uganda's political parties called the cabinet formed in 2006 'too big' and a 'waste of taxpayers' money' (Namutebi et al. 2006) . Watchdog groups echoed these complaints in 2011 when the number of ministers grew, along with their salaries (Kaiza 2011) . In Kenya, when competing political parties increased the number of cabinet seats in 2008, former Member of Parliament and Nobel Prize Laureate Wangari Maathai complained that the government was 'very expensive' (Ogutu and Machuka 2008) . Civil society groups and editorials in the press widely condemned the coalition for its costs (Bosire 2008) . Which one of these economic narratives is more representative of the economic effects of African cabinets?
Using time-series cross-sectional data on 45 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1971 and 2006, we test the impact of two different measures of cabinet size on budgetary policy performance. When measuring cabinet size in terms of the number of ministries, statistical tests show that big cabinets are strongly associated with federal budget surpluses, and weakly correlated with increases in patronage spending. When considering cabinet size in terms of single or multiple parties, tests show that coalition governments have no systematic impact on budget surpluses, but they consistently extract less revenue and spend less on patronage. This is important since patronage is deeply entrenched in Africa's neo-patrimonial states with strong executives (van de Walle 2003) , and the idea of political appointments as patronage is very much within the mainstream of the comparative literature in Africa and beyond (Kopecký 2011; Arriola 2009 ). We attribute these results to the differing effects of parties and portfolios: multiparty cabinets in Africa enhance economic policy accountability by promoting horizontal monitoring across the government. Under these conditions, powerful executives have less latitude to dispense patronage and individual ministers have less leverage to demand it. Our empirical findings offer support for institutional research that highlights the benefits of coalition governments (Reynolds 2011; Lijphart 2012) . We attribute the effects of portfolios to their role in policy specialization. The results do not mean that citizen concerns about inflated ministerial salaries are misplaced, but they do suggest that egregious examples such as Kenya's and Uganda's are not representative of the broader economic effects of coalition governments.
The dearth of research on African cabinets is surprising for several reasons. Cabinets are an important means of gauging how well the executive branch represents political and social diversity. Proponents of power sharing, 'consociationalism,' and 'consensus government' maintain that enhancing political representation does not adversely affect economic outcomes (Norris 2008; Lijphart 2012) . This is questioned by research on post-conflict policy making (Rothschild and Roeder 2005; Jarstad and Sisk 2008) , by evidence from wealthy countries about the effects of multi-party coalition governments (Alesina et al. 1997; Balassone and Giordano 2001) , and by costly power sharing agreements in cases such as Kenya and Zimbabwe (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010) . Studying the consequences of cabinet size in Africa is important because it addresses these conflicting empirical findings. Moreover, as we detail below, the average number ministries and the frequency of multiparty coalitions have increased steadily in Africa, yet it is not clear if these trends have affected economic performance.
We first review literature that identifies cabinet size as a source of critical variation among executives. Though we are interested in the consequences of cabinet size, we review existing research which attributes the growth of Africa's cabinets to population growth, democratization, post-conflict power-sharing agreements, and cultural norms of inclusion.
Second, we point to conflicting evidence -mostly from wealthy countries -about the economic consequences of cabinets. Several features of African politics suggest that large cabinets will be linked to inferior economic performance, including the high transaction costs of bargaining by undisciplined parties, weak collective cabinet responsibility, and strong presidential patronage systems. Third, we adopt two different measures of cabinet size and formulate predictions about how they should theoretically affect economic performance. A 'portfolio' hypothesis states that additional ministers will improve economic outcomes through increased policy specialization. A 'parties' hypothesis states that multi-party coalition governments improve economic performance through intra-governmental monitoring. Fourth, empirical tests of these hypotheses under different statistical specifications show that cabinets with more ministries are more likely to run federal budget surpluses, but they also tend to spend more on patronage. Multiparty coalition governments tell a different story: they consistently extract less revenue from citizens and they spend less money on patronage. These results remain significant even after controlling for a country's wealth, colonial history, population size, constraints on the executive, level of democracy, oil wealth, type of party system, and ethnic and religious fractionalization. Based on these results, we suggest that the numbers of parties and portfolios both influence the economic consequences of African cabinets. But since multiparty coalitions have to contend with competing interests to make policy, this increase opportunities and incentives for economic policy accountability. The conclusion points out that the results have important implications for democratization because enhancing horizontal accountability through coalition governments might chip away at the discretionary authority of dominant executives.
EXECUTIVE CABINETS AND AFRICAN POLITICS
In this section we document the dramatic increase in the number of ministers in African cabinets over the last four decades, and then draw upon the comparative literature to explain why parties are essential part of understanding cabinets. Next, even though this study is focused on the effects of Africa's growing cabinet size, we briefly review the literature examining its causes including population growth, institutional reforms related to democratization, cultural norms of inclusion, and post-conflict power-sharing agreements. All of these factors underscore the need to understand the consequences of Africa's large cabinets.
In a 1989 essay, written just before Africa's era of dramatic democratization, a leading Nigerian political scientist noted 'a phenomenal increase in the size of the modern cabinet' (Osaghae 1989: 129 Figure 1 , which includes 1,561 observations from the Arthur Banks data set, illustrates this steady growth. Uganda provides one of many examples of this trend:
when Yoweri Museveni took power in 1986 there were 33 ministers in his cabinet. Two decades later this number had grown to 69 ministers as he adapted to pressures to include a broader range of regional interests and ethnic groups (Tripp 2010: 49) . 'The cabinet is not only large but virtually useless,' said one Ugandan scholar. 'The intention of the cabinet is to appease the head of state. It is based on the idea that when you have a huge cabinet, it is incapable of making serious decisions' (Kiapi 2010) . The chair of Uganda's parliamentary budget committee called the cabinet 'too big for the economy' (Osike and Olupot 2002) , and shrinking the cabinet has been a top priority for the opposition. 'The size of this cabinet is too big. We think it should be smaller,' said the head of the leading opposition party. 'They have come to waste taxpayers' money yet we do not have the money' (Namutebi et al. 2006) .
[Figure 1 goes about here]
One reason why scholars analyze the number of parties alongside the number of ministers is because the two are closely related. Comparative research finds that the number of ministries tends to increase with the number of parties, at least when parties seek policy change (Laver and Schofield 1998) . According to Lijphart's seminal study, the number of parties and ministries in a cabinet is the most important indicator of how representative the government is of society, and a central distinction between his two contrasting models of democracy, consensus and majoritarianism, which fundamentally differ in terms of the breadth of representative participation in the executive branch (Lijphart 2012) . In Africa, cabinets are especially important because the composition of ministries is a common gauge of the inclusiveness of government.
For example, in Nigeria, the representative quality of the ministries is a 'cardinal principle' of government: 'For practical politics and peaceful coexistence of diverse elements, the composition of the cabinet should reflect the diversities in a polity' (Osaghae 1989: 131 ).
Posner's study of Zambia claims that the ethnic background of cabinet ministers informs voter choice and politicians' electoral strategies, reflecting an ethic of inclusion (Posner 2005) . Some cross-national research goes so far as to use cabinet size as a proxy variable for inclusiveness, since cabinet size correlates closely with level of ethnic diversity (Arriola 2009 ). Cabinet composition is also often used to estimate the political salience of ethnic groups or their relative access to power (Posner 2004; Wimmer et al. 2009 ).
At least four demonstrable factors have driven the growth of Africa's cabinets. First, a demographic connection follows from a strong correlation between cabinet size and population size. Africa's cabinets have apparently grown in part because the continent has experienced rapid population growth (Arriola 2009 ). This makes sense if one considers the division of labor in government expanding alongside increasing social complexity. Second, democratization in the 1990s influenced cabinet size because the return of multi-party politics ushered in a new wave of coalition governments (Oyugi 2006) . This is empirically reflected by the growth of multiparty coalition governments during this period: Out of the 74 percent of governments for which we have data, in 1971 less than 3 percent were coalition governments and less than a quarter were Norms of inclusion stand out as a fourth factor arguably shaping African cabinets. In Sundiata, the epic story telling the rise of Mali's empire in the 13 th Century, the scheming halfbrother of the story's hero is ridiculed because he selfishly declares 'power cannot be shared' (Sundiata 1965). Africa's nationalists later embraced this sort of rhetoric. Tanzania's Julius
Nyerere believed his 'inclusive, participatory' model of governance with consensus building would both deepen democracy and facilitate economic growth (Baregu 1994) . In preindependence Nigeria, several constitutions enshrined political inclusion through ethnic balancing of the bureaucracy and the legislature's top positions (Ekeh and Osaghae 1989) . For over half a century, dictators and democrats alike have implemented such practices. Senegal provides another example, where the discourse of democracy emphasizes the Wolof idea of demokaraasi. In this tradition, voters value conformity because it brings social security and they seek consensus because it brings stability. Including different opinions and 'harmonizing' them is therefore more important than alternance -alternating political power between parties (Schaffer 1998; Gellar 2005) .
In sum, the number of ministers and the frequency of coalition governments have grown dramatically since the 1970s for a variety of reasons according to the existing literature, including population growth and post-conflict power-sharing agreements. There is also some evidence that large cabinets reflect African cultural traditions of inclusiveness. But many citizens value majoritarian qualities that promote alternating power rather than sharing it; African satisfaction with democracy in fact increases substantially after the electoral defeat of the incumbent party leads to alternation (Bratton 2008 Moreover, the constitutional referendum in 2010 essentially rejected that power-sharing agreement, endorsing a largely presidential, majoritarian model of government.
All of this suggests that the literature would benefit from an empirical examination of the impact of cabinet size, and that African citizens are demanding answers. The next section clarifies our definitions and describes some comparative findings about the economic impact of cabinet size.
ARE AFRICA'S CABINETS CUMBERSOME?
Complaints about big cabinets appear to be common in Africa. Yet we have few empirical studies which examine the economic effects of cabinet size outside of developed countries. In this section we state our definitions of who constitutes a minister and what counts as a coalition government, drawing on the comparative literature. Next, we discuss research that comes to conflicting conclusions about the economic impact of large cabinets. On the one hand, large cabinets should undermine budgetary responsibility because policy logrolls become expensive in the aggregate. On the other hand, large cabinets could improve economic performance by making the policy process more specialized, and creating new incentives for intra-governmental accountability. Finally, we identify common institutional features in Africa that make portfolio allocation especially important -and individual ministers unusually weak.
Who counts as a minister? This is important not only for operational purposes, but because it sets a threshold for determining who actually has the ability to impact spending decisions. One recent study suggests that relying on function to operationalize a definition can present more complications than departing from a legal, institutional understanding (Barbieri and Vercesi 2013) . A standard approach is to count only officials with full ministerial rank, thus excluding deputy ministers, secretaries of state, regional ministers, or other officials who would add even more to these numbers (van de Walle 2001) . To the best of our knowledge, the Banks dataset follows this definition closely. As for a multi-party coalition government, the classic understanding stems from parliamentary politics, where a coalition is a set of political parties who: (1) agree to pursue common goals; (2) pool their resources in order to achieve these goals;
(3) communicate and form binding commitments concerning their goals; and (4) agree on the distribution of payoffs to be received after the coalition meets its objectives (Browne and Dreijmanis 1982) . Thus the size of the coalition derives from a direct measure of the number of political parties in the cabinet rather than from a proxy. Popular accommodation rather than elite bargaining drives coalition size. On average, this means that multiparty coalitions produce cabinets with more portfolios (Laver and Schofield 1998) . reckless levels of spending during the 1990s. One classic study reports that multi-party coalition governments are much more likely to run budget deficits (Alesina et al. 1997) . The World Bank explains that since coalition governments require so many compromises and payoffs, 'fiscal outcomes are often worse than when majority governments are in power' (World Bank 2002).
Consistent with these findings, Persson and Tabellini (2003) report that majoritarian (ie, single party) governments produce smaller deficits, regardless of whether the system is parliamentary or presidential. Wehner more modestly reports that single party cabinets can mitigate but not necessarily prevent deficit spending by reducing the conditions of partisan fragmentation (Wehner 2010) . Other studies focused specifically on the number of ministries, rather than the number of parties, clearly link additional portfolios to larger budget deficits (Volkerink and De Haan 2001b; Woo 2003) . Almost all of the cross-national research is limited to wealthy countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The existing literature thus arrives at conflicting conclusions, and we know very little about the economic effects of cabinets in Africa. Cabinets could indirectly impact the economy in a variety of ways, shaping the political conditions for economic growth or the ability to discipline monetary policy. But cabinets have more direct effects on public finance since they debate and shape spending priorities. For this reason it makes sense to focus on budgetary policy, particularly the impacts on revenue, spending, and the joint interaction of the two.
A causal link between cabinet size and budgetary policy could manifest itself in two ways: First, an increase in cabinet size could mean more political actors demanding resources or receiving side payments. In such situations policy making becomes a 'logroll' that supplies payoffs to everyone (Strøm 2003 Before doing so though, it is important to point out common characteristics of the institutional environment in Africa. First, executives enjoy a variety of advantages over parties.
Nearly every African executive is classified as a presidential republic in which the head of state is also the head of government, or a mixed republic with a president and a prime minister; a few countries are actually monarchies or pure military states. 2 This is significant because, as Africa's post-independence leaders noted, the collective responsibility of parliamentary government creates incentives for restraint (Hatchard et al. 2004: 69) . Second, even in presidential systems, African executives often appoint sitting members of the legislature to the cabinet, giving them the ability to exercise tremendous power over individual ministers' behavior (Lindberg and Zhou 2009 ). Some constitutional scholars in fact argue that the level of executive discretion over cabinets corresponds with the number of ministries (Hatchard et al. 2004) . Third, modern
African political parties have very few ideological differences (Bleck and van de Walle 2011) .
This makes standard approaches from the American or European literature, such as the use of a left/right continuum and median voter models, less useful for understanding cabinet behavior (and nearly impossible to estimate). In sum, given the absence of collective responsibility, the fusion of legislative and executive authority through the appointment of sitting members of the legislature, and weak ideological cleavages, African executives enjoy great latitude.
OPERATIONALIZATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION
Whether one measures cabinet size in terms of parties or ministries, there are compelling reasons to expect either good or bad economic performance, and existing comparative research points to conflicting findings. We formulate two hypotheses to test the impact of both measures on impact on accountability (which will control for below). In sum, we argue that African ministers possess weak incentives and little individual capacity to demand patronage, while parties in coalition governments use their political leverage to increase accountability across government.
We measure budgetary policy performance with three different dependent variables.
First, the variable budget is the federal budget surplus or deficit, expressed as a share of GDP in local currency units, similar to operationalizations adopted by Roubini and Sachs (1989a; Roubini and Sachs 1989b to reward allies or buyoff potential critics, this will appear in higher overall levels of spending.
These three variables are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2012).
Control Variables
To control for different historical conditions, we include a standard dummy variable for whether a country is former British colony. This is important because these countries tend to be associated with other political characteristics, including more majoritarian models of democracy, Single Member District-plurality electoral systems, and looser controls on civil society (Widner 1994 (Teorell 2010) . We therefore include the natural log of the population as the variable Logpop.
We also include the variable GrowthGDP measuring the rate of economic growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, from the World Development Indicators. This control is important because economic outcomes could be endogenous to the level of development.
Outside of Africa, poor economic conditions also tend to impact the number of ministries, increasing them (Verzichelli 2008 ). This variable also reflects the tremendous variation in African countries: larger economies might require a more complex division of labor managed through additional ministries or broader debates among different economic interests represented by various parties. Perhaps most importantly, we include GrowthGDP because a large literature linking economic cycles to political institutions departs from the notion that the short term nature of politicians' self-interest interferes with the extended time horizon conducive to formulating sound macroeconomic policies -notably balanced budgets (Franzese 2002 (Lindberg 2006) , and our construction of a new variable using Elections in Africa (Nohlen et al. 1999) yielded too many gaps and fewer data points than Banks. Until African countries have experienced more electoral democracy, and such sources have been updated, we believe a dummy variable is a reasonable alternative; majoritarian democracies ('power concentrating' in Lijphart's terms) tend to govern through a single party anyway, and our current approach enabled us to include authoritarian governments in the 1970s and 1980s that included parties.
Coalition governments on average have five more ministries (25.4) than single-party governments (20.5), 5 and the t-test shows there is a statistically significant difference. This suggests an implicit interaction between the cabinet and ministries variables. Our sample includes 45 African countries between 1971 and 2006 for a total of 1,560 observations. This includes 335 instances of coalition governments. Correlation analysis (not shown) implies that cabinets with more ministries tend to run budget surpluses, extract less revenue, and engage in lower levels of government consumption. Bivariate association tests for coalition governments suggest that they run smaller budget deficits, collect less revenue, and spend less on government consumption compared to single party governments.
EMPIRICAL TESTS FOR PORTFOLIOS AND PARTIES
We perform regression analysis to obtain OLS coefficient estimates with panel corrected standard errors for each of our dependent variables (budget, revenue and expenditure). 6 This is an appropriate technique since the data contains fewer years than cases cross-sectionally.
Consistent results across different models is a standard econometric check for robustness (Greene 2008) . We first test our hypotheses on budget as the dependent variable as specified in adverse impact on budget surpluses; the same goes for ethnic but interestingly not religious fractionalization. Civilian government has no statistically significant impact. The results thus far point to statistically significant support for the portfolio hypothesis, suggesting that additional ministries enhance budgetary specialization, but they neither support nor refute the parties hypothesis, since coalition governments have a very weak effect on the budget variable.
[Table 1 goes about here]
The second test of our hypotheses considers the effects of cabinet size on revenues, to see if large cabinets are more extractive. These tests also allow us to ensure that the results with the budget variable were not biased by lower revenue collection. In equation 2, revenue it is the government revenue of the i th country collected at the t th year: 
The estimation results of equation 2 are displayed in Table 2 . The statistically insignificant values on ministries mean that cabinets with more portfolios do not extract more revenue through higher tax rates or more zealous collection. In relation to the previous tests, this means that the good performance on the budget variable is actually being underwritten by fiscal discipline, rather than extractive policies. At the same time, coalition governments systematically extract less: specifically, they collect on average 6.2 to 7.7 percent less revenue as a share of the GDP in models 2, 3, and 4. In terms of our controls, democracies collect on average 0.1 percent more revenues. Stronger executive constraints are also associated with higher tax rates or better tax collection, ranging between one and 1.1 percentage points on revenue. These two control variables suggest an implicit relationship between democracy and taxation in Africa, whether it is measured in terms of horizontal accountability (captured by the Xconstrain variable) or electoral democracy. The control for British colonies is significant, indicating that these countries extract 1.8 to 2.6 additional percentage points more in models 1 and 2. Countries with oil revenue appear to collect on average more budget revenues by about 0.3 and 0.4 percent extra revenues for each additional percent of oil rent per GDP. Increased ethnic fractionalization unsurprisingly reduces the revenues collected by around 15 percent, according to models 3 and 4.
But as in the tests with equation 1, religious fractionalization is an insignificant factor. Civilian governments -whether dictatorships or democracies -extract on average 3.1 percent more revenue. This time, single party governments have no significant impact, most likely because rulers who want to avoid open multi-party competition see political risks in extracting too much from citizens. In sum, since coalition governments systematically extract less from citizens, this supports the idea that parties rather than simply portfolio promote good budgetary policy.
[Table 2 goes about here]
The third test of our hypotheses considers the effects of cabinet size on government consumption as a share of GDP, which we use as a proxy for patronage. If additional ministers or parties increase the overall level of patronage, this will be visible as positive coefficients on the expenditure variable, suggesting these governments engage in policy logrolls to satisfy everyone. 
The estimation results of equation 3 are displayed in Table 3 . There is weak evidence in model 3 that each additional ministry results in 0.2 percent point more government expenditure as a percent of the GDP. The insignificant coefficients of ministries in the other models offer no support for the portfolio hypothesis. By contrast, multi-party coalition governments systematically have lower rates of government consumption at a statistically significant level.
Specifically, coalition governments on average spent 5.4 to 6.2 percent less as a share of the GDP in models 2, 3, and 4. The level of democracy is not statistically significant in any of the models. Stronger executive constraints are associated with increases in patronage spending, ranging between 0.9 and 1.4 percentage points across all four models at a statistically significant level. Taken together, the results with these two controls suggest that it is specifically parties in government, rather than other mechanisms of horizontal accountability (or electoral democracy) that restrains patronage spending. The population control in model 2 suggests that a one percent population increase may increase the government spending by 0.9 additional percentage points.
Ethnic fractionalization appears to reduce government consumption spending between 6.9 and 8.2 percent, as suggested by estimates from model 3 and 4. On its face, this seems odd. However this may suggest that in Africa's highly heterogeneous nations, there are significant transaction costs involved in colluding across ethnic groups in order to distribute patronage. British colonial history, religious fractionalization, civilian and single party governance have no statistically significant impact in any of the models. In sum, rather than engaging in policy logrolls through collusion, coalition governments reduce the level of patronage spending through horizontal monitoring, offering strong support for our parties hypothesis.
[Table 3 goes about here]
These three sets of tests show that cabinet size impacts budgetary policy in Africa, but
that it is important to analyze parties alongside ministries. There is evidence that additional ministries increase policy specialization, along the lines of the example from Nigeria mentioned in the introduction, since these governments are associated with budget surpluses. But significantly, the absence of a strong relationship with the expenditure variable suggests that ministers possess neither the leverage to demand patronage for themselves, nor the resources to dispense it on a significant level. Coalition governments though, extract less and spend less, suggesting that multiparty cabinets are both less predatory towards citizens and less likely to indulge in patronage spending. The results hold across a broad range of controls.
Based on these results, we argue that the impact of Africa's cabinets on budgetary policy depends more on parties than portfolio. We have no trouble accepting the idea that cabinet appointments serve as important patronage tools for executives, as others claim (van de Walle 2001; Arriola 2009 ). But our results show that ministers acting as individuals face significant collective action problems, and the mere presence of a multi-party system, measured by the SingleParty variable, does little to overcome these barriers. Africa's executives seek an efficient coalition that affords them political latitude, and multiparty coalition governments can limit executive discretion by lowering the transaction costs of horizontal accountability across the government. In this way, they may serve as useful stepping stones -until political competition is more robust -to improved economic outcomes.
CONCLUSION
African cabinet size has been increasing since the early 1970s due to factors such as democratization, post-conflict power-sharing, and population growth. Yet we have virtually no comparative research about the economic consequences of this striking empirical trend. Looking at both the number of parties and portfolios in cabinets, we found that creating new ministries improved budgetary discipline, a relationship that we attributed to increased governmental specialization. There is weak evidence that multiparty coalition cabinets contribute to budget deficits, rather than surpluses. However, these cabinets do systematically extract less and spend less. These results hold even after controlling for colonial history, economic conditions, checks on executive authority, level of democracy, population size, civilian government, oil income, type of party system, and ethnic and religious divisions.
One possible implication of our findings is that until electoral competition increases in Africa, multi-party governments just might contribute to democratization by restraining executive authority in the interim. We hope to directly test this in future research with additional data on alternation of power, and perhaps the internal dynamics of parties. Our findings also inform classic debates about the benefits of 'consensus' models of democracy associated with multi-party coalition governments and power-sharing through portfolio allocations. Skeptics have reported correlations between coalition governments and weak fiscal discipline, including budget deficits (Voigt 2011; Persson and Tabellini 2003) . By contrast, proponents of consensus democracy have argued there is no tradeoff between broad based governments that enhance political inclusion and economic performance (Norris 2008; Reynolds 2011; Lijphart 2012) .
Hardly any of this cross-national research has focused on Africa though, and we find very little support for skeptics of coalition governments who associate them with deficits in OECD countries. Instead, our analysis of a complex set of 45 cases over four decades suggests that the proponents of consensus government may be right.
At least three important caveats are in order though. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that cabinets with a large number of ministries are wasteful, and there is no denying this in egregious cases such as Uganda, Kenya, and Gabon. Our results are hardly an endorsement for big salaries or new unnecessary ministries and instead make a subtle case for a combination of expertise and horizontal accountability. In addition, though cases such as Zimbabwe and Gabon illustrate provide some details about how cabinet size impacts bargaining, we appreciate that much richer qualitative research is needed to clarify the causal mechanisms we identified inductively. As the Third Wave of democratization turns 25 years old in Africa, new cohorts of former politicians are waiting to tell their stories to field researchers. Third, though government consumption is a valid -and common -measure of patronage, we hope to have access to different categories of government spending for future research. This would enable a study of how competing preferences within cabinets impact budgetary policy priorities, for example by shifting spending from sectors such as defense to social sector programs that are more popular to aspiring political candidates. In conclusion, given the importance of parties for understanding the impact of portfolio, we hope our findings contribute to new research about these critical African institutions: their internal dynamics, their potential to either promote or restrain patronage, and their bargaining behavior across a broad range of regimes. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 5%, 1%, 0.1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 5%, 1%, 0.1% level, respectively. Laver and Schofield's (1998) research in European that demonstrates a growth in ministries as the number of parties in government increases. 6 Our data has more cross-unit (countries) relative to the time periods and panel generalized least square (GLS) estimates are not feasible (N < T is required for feasibility of GLS estimates). See Beck and Katz Beck, N. & Katz, J. N. (1995) What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series CrossSectional Data. American Political Science Review, 89, pp. 634-647. We used Stata xtpcse command to produce robust estimates with standard errors that are robust to disturbances being correcting for heteroscedasticity, contemporaneously cross-sectionally correlated, and autocorrelated of type AR(1). In addition, in order to eliminate the impact of outliers, we eliminated the extreme values of the dependent variables. In particular, we excluded observations with the values of expenditure or revenue share of GDP higher than 0.7 and observation with the annual inflation rate higher than 100%.
